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INTRODUCTION

Over half of the world’s population now lives in urban areas, increasing pressure on city governments to implement sustainable and equitable growth strategies.1 Now more than ever, urban sprawl rears its head in environmental, social,
and fiscal issues, and local governments are on the frontlines.2 However, cities
must balance the costs of urban growth against the benefits of adding new residents.3 Some local governments already implement policies to address urban
growth, and there is much to learn from their endeavors.4
Many cities embrace growth because it generates significant fiscal advantages
for their jurisdiction.5 To attract new residents, local governments invest in revitalizing their downtown centers and update zoning to permit higher density housing.6 If governments successfully attract new residents, the city benefits in a variety of ways: Primarily, increasing the number of residents expands a city’s tax
base, freeing up more resources to invest in local infrastructure, schools, and
public transportation.7 Increased populations can also attract new grocery stores
and health care centers to areas that lack convenient access to fresh food or quality healthcare.8 Finally, increased housing density and improved public

1
Richard Florida, Just How Much of the World is Urban?, CITY LAB (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-06/how-urban-is-the-world-s-population-experts-disagree.
2
What is Urban Sprawl?, CONSERVE ENERGY FUTURE, https://www.conserve-energy-future.com/causes-and-effects-of-urban-sprawl.php (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
3
See Angela Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to
Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. 758, 777 (2020) (comparing the benefits
of gentrification against the costs of growth).
4
See, e.g., LUKE HERRINE ET AL., GENTRIFICATION RESPONSE: A SURVEY OF STRATEGIES
TO MAINTAIN NEIGHBORHOOD ECONOMIC DIVERSITY 121–23 (2016) (discussing policy strategies adopted by different cities across the United States).
5
See Robert W. Wassmer Marlon G. Boarnet, The Benefits of Growth 1 (Urban Land
Inst., Working Paper, 2002) (discussing the fiscal benefits of growth).
6
Justin Graham, Comment, Playing “Fair” with Urban Redevelopment: A Defense of
Gentrification Under the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Test, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1719,
1735 (2013); see SMART GROWTH AMERICA, (RE)BUILDING DOWNTOWN: A GUIDEBOOK FOR
REVITALIZATION 16–18 (2015), available at https://smartgrowthamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/rebuilding-downtown-1.pdf (discussing examples of how local governments
can attract new residents).
7
See Graham, supra note 6, at 1735, 1743 (discussing improved public services in conjunction with growth of the tax base).
8
Joseph Gibbons et al., Evaluating Gentrification’s Relation to Neighborhood and City
Health, 13(11) PLOS ONE 1, 2–3 (2018).
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transportation can reduce local traffic, resulting in lower carbon emissions, less
pollution, and better air quality.9
Despite the many benefits of urban growth, progress comes at a cost.10 Economic development projects can raise the local cost of living, which risks pricing
out11 low-income residents.12 The most vulnerable residents live in areas labeled
as “low-value,”13 “up and coming,” or “opportunity zones”:14 These labels are
often used to describe “underserved” urban neighborhoods where real estate developers can buy cheap land and, in some cases, receive tax abatements for doing
so.15 This type of property speculation often foreshadows the onset of new businesses and homes built to attract more wealthy residents.16 Once wealthier residents move into the revitalized neighborhood, businesses and property owners
raise prices in response to increased demand for goods and housing in the area.17
However, the increased cost of living pressures local, low-income residents to
move away to more affordable neighborhoods.18
The effects of speculative investment in urban neighborhoods highlight the
racial, socioeconomic, 19 and cultural20 factors that complicate city revitalization.
9
Jeff Turrentine, When Public Transportation Leads to Gentrification, NRDC (June 1,
2018), https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/when-public-transportation-leads-gentrification.
10
See Angela Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of gentrification).
11
Richard Florida, The Complicated Link Between Gentrification and Displacement, CITY
LAB (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-08/the-complex-relationship-between-gentrification-and-displacement.
12
See Ashley J. Qiang et al., Displacement and the Consequences of Gentrification 1, 2
(Duke Univ., Working Paper, 2020), available at https://sites.duke.edu/wenwang/files/2020/01/Gentrification_and_Displacement_Working_Paper.pdf (discussing the
connection between gentrification and increased costs of living on low-income incumbent residents).
13
Angela Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3.
14
Andrew Khouri, Can California Boost Home Building Without Super Charging Gentrification?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-housing-affordability-gentrification-20190423-story.html (associating the “up and coming” label with
the potential for gentrification); Jason Richardson et al., Shifting Neighborhoods: Gentrification and Cultural Displacement in American Cities, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL. (Mar.
19, 2019), https://ncrc.org/gentrification/ (see the “Discussion & Conclusion” section).
15
William Fulton, Opportunity Zones: Gentrification on Steroids?, KINDER INST. FOR
URB. RSCH. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://kinder.rice.edu/urbanedge/2019/02/20/opportunity-zonesgentrification-steroids.
16
Gentrification Explained, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT, https://www.urbandisplacement.org/gentrification-explained (last visited Dec. 12, 2020) (noting that gentrification can
appear as “[r]eal estate speculation, with investors flipping properties for large profits, as well
as high-end development, and landlords looking for higher-paying tenants”).
17
Richardson et al., supra note 14 (see “Literature Review” section).
18
Id.
19
Angela Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3.
20
Richardson et al., supra note 14 (see “Discussion and Review” section) (explaining the
results of a study showing how gentrification causes cultural displacement).
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These effects fall under the umbrella term “gentrification,” defined as “a process
in which portions of cities are transformed from areas that service low-income
populations towards spaces that, by servicing higher-income populations, generate more capital for investors.”21 Gentrification is also described as “the middleand upper-class remake of the central city—not just a residential phenomenon,
but one that affects commercial and retail areas as well.”22
To successfully curb gentrification, stakeholders in the public and private sector must work together.23 Local governments are key to successful partnerships,
as they contribute the force of law to anti-gentrification policies.24 Local representatives should participate to ensure their constituencies’ interests are represented. Lawyers are also needed to design policies that will withstand legal challenge. In other words, public and private sector collaboration is essential to
limiting gentrification’s negative effects.
Major cities across the world experience gentrification25 and many enact policies to curb rapid development and prevent displacement of low-income residents.26 Atlanta, Georgia and Berlin, Germany specifically adopted promising
tools to eliminate the negative effects of gentrification. While Atlanta and Berlin’s governments have much to learn from each other, their differences also
show that fighting gentrification requires a multi-faceted set of legal tools.

21
Miles Walser, Putting the Brakes on Rent Increases: How the United States Could Implement German Anti-Gentrification Laws Without Running Afoul of the Takings Clause, 36
WIS. INT’L L.J. 186, 187 (2018) (citing PETER MOSKOWIT, HOW TO KILL A CITY:
GENTRIFICATION, INEQUALITY, AND THE FIGHT FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD (2017); DAVID
MADDEN & PETER MARCUSE, IN DEFENSE OF HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF CRISIS (2016)).
22
Diane K. Levy et al., In the Face of Gentrification: Case Studies of Local Efforts to
Mitigate Displacement, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMTY. DEV. L. 238, 240 (2007).
23
Anne Marie Pippin, Note, Community Involvement in Brownfield Redevelopment
Makes Cents: A Study of Brownfield Redevelopment Initiatives in the United States and Central and Eastern Europe, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589, 592 (2009) (discussing New Jersey’s
strategic choice to include various stakeholders in a redevelopment project); see also Angela
Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3 (noting that gentrification is usually caused by the
combined actions of public and private economic investment).
24
See, e.g., Mitchell Crispell, How’d They Do It? A Look at Three Places That Avoided
Gentrification, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.urbandisplacement.org/blog/how’d-they-do-it-look-three-places-avoided-gentrification (discussing cities
which successfully slowed gentrification through laws instead of voluntary policies).
25
See, e.g., Anne B. Shlay & John Balzarini, Urban Sociology, in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 926, 931 (James D. Wright et al., 2015); Wendie N. Choudary,
Mitigating Gentrification; see also How Several Sun Belt Cities Are Responding, RICE KINDER
INST. FOR URB. RES. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://kinder.rice.edu/2018/12/12/mitigating-gentrification-how-several-sun-belt-cities-are-responding.
26
See, e.g., Herrine et al., supra note 4.
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A. Displacement
The core issue with gentrification is that it often displaces low-income original27 residents.28 Displacement occurs when residents can no longer afford to live
in their neighborhood because local development raises the cost of living.29 Displacement disproportionately affects low-income residents, forcing them to leave
behind support networks and community cultural capital.30 Gentrification often
displaces low-income Black and Latinx families first, preventing many BIPOC
residents from gleaning the economic benefits gentrification brings to their
neighborhood.31 If cities allow gentrification to progress without restraint, gentrification will eventually displace both low-income and middle-class residents
from urban cores, exacerbating socioeconomic and racial segregation within cities.32
While a variety of factors cause displacement, they can be grouped into three
main categories: direct, exclusionary, and pressure displacement.33 Direct displacement occurs “when residents are forced to move because of rent increases
and/or building renovations.”34 Exclusionary displacement happens when the influx of wealthy residents reduces housing options for incumbent low-income
families, forcing them to seek housing in different neighborhoods.35 Finally, displacement pressures describe the challenges that low-income residents face
“when supports and services that [they] rely on disappear from the neighborhood.”36 The various causes of displacement highlight the need for policy solutions which are broad enough to address the complex causes of displacement, yet
effective enough to enact change.

27
In this paper, “original residents” refers to individuals who lived in an area pre-gentrification.
28
Richardson et al., supra note 14 (see “Executive Summary” section).
29
Levy et al., supra note 22, at 240.
30
Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Displacement in the
Age of Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2016); see Richardson et al.,
supra note 14.
31
Richardson et al., supra note 14 (see “Executive Summary” section); Angela Harris &
Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3.
32
See Li, supra note 30, at 1192, 1199 (discussing the consequences of resegregation
caused by gentrification).
33
Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization: What’s the Difference?, NAT’L LOW
INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Apr. 5, 2019), https://nlihc.org/resource/gentrification-and-neighborhood-revitalization-whats-difference.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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B. Relevance
This topic merits legal attention because housing, tax, and land use laws are
significant drivers of gentrification. To illustrate, state and local governments
can encourage gentrification “through tax exemptions for large real-estate developments, providing necessary infrastructure and adjusting legal and planning
regulations in accordance with the objectives of the real estate industry . . . .”37
If laws can promote gentrification, they can also limit it.38 Therefore, public authorities should promulgate laws that respect market forces and encourage economic development, but also include protections for communities most vulnerable to displacement.39

II.

ATLANTA AND BERLIN: ANTI-GENTRIFICATION MECHANISMS

Two cities stand out in the fight against gentrification: Atlanta, Georgia and
Berlin, Germany. Atlanta and Berlin exemplify two common ways local and state
governments fight gentrification, and their successes and failures offer important
lessons. Commentators frequently cite Atlanta as an example of gentrification’s
positive and negative effects.40 Atlanta’s gentrification problem exposes the
city’s unique racial dynamics as white residents continue to buy up property in
“a city historically described as a ‘black mecca.’”41 Atlanta’s government made
the city distinctly vulnerable to gentrification when it tore down all of the city’s

37
Hisham Ashkar, The Role of Laws and Regulations in Shaping Gentrification, 22 CITY
341, 343 (2018).
38
See id. at 342–43; see Sanda Feder, Stanford Professor’s Study Finds Gentrification
Disproportionately Affects Minorities, STAN. NEWS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://news.stanford.edu/2020/12/01/gentrification-disproportionately-affects-minorities/ (proposing solutions to gentrification in the form of residential stability policies for lower-income residents in
gentrifying communities).
39
See How American Cities are Handling Neighborhood Change, Gentrification and Displacement, RICE KINDER INST. FOR URB. RES. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://kinder.rice.edu/urbanedge/2019/09/23/how-american-cities-are-handling-neighborhood-change-gentrificationand-displacement (highlighting strategies to prevent displacement).
40
See, e.g., Christopher Quinn, Atlanta Ranked Fourth-Fastest Gentrifying City in U.S.,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (July 19, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-news/atlantaranked-fourth-fastest-gentrifying-city/E74wz9VxF5TxWcsUinKRmK/.
41
Jamiles Lartey, Nowhere for People to Go: Who Will Survive the Gentrification of Atlanta?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/oct/23/nowherefor-people-to-go-who-will-survive-the-gentrification-of-atlanta.
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public housing projects,42 leaving nearly all of “its housing subject to the invisible hand of market forces.”43 Berlin, on the other hand, has strong legal protections for low-income residents but still encourages beneficial economic development.44 Like Atlanta, Berlin’s gentrification occurs within a unique historical
context, as its economic development is closely tied to the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989.45 Atlanta and Berlin’s approach to curbing gentrification offers invaluable insight and lessons for cities facing similar challenges.
A. Atlanta
Atlanta, Georgia is rapidly gentrifying.46 Between 2000 and 2017, Atlanta’s
median rent increased by 70%, the median income increased by 48%, and the
median home value increased by 46%.47 In 2019, a Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia study concluded that “Atlanta has the fourth largest share of gentrifying neighborhoods . . . .”48 Admittedly, Atlanta’s redevelopment projects bring
substantial benefits to the city. Neighborhood revitalization projects generated
higher property tax revenues,49 developers repurposed abandoned historic buildings,50 and Atlanta organizations commenced construction of the Beltline.51
However, it is unclear whether the benefits conferred upon Atlanta outweigh the
issues caused by the rapid increase in development.52 These revitalization
42

Id.
Id.
44
Kate Connolly, ‘No Bling in the Hood . . .’ Does Berlin’s Anti-Gentrification Law Really Work?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/oct/04/doesberlin-anti-gentrification-law-really-work-neukolln.
45
Elisabeth Zerofsky, The Causes and Consequences of Berlin’s Rapid Gentrification,
NEW YORKER (July 12, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-causes-andconsequences-of-berlins-rapid-gentrification.
46
See Lartey, supra note 41 (explaining that 46% of Atlanta’s census tracts are currently
gentrifying); see also Quinn, supra note 40.
47
ONE ATLANTA: HOUSING AFFORDABILITY ACTION PLAN 1, 6 (2019), available at
https://www.atlantaga.gov/home/showdocument?id=42220.
48
Jason Braverman, Atlanta is Nation’s Fourth Fastest Gentrifying City, Study Says,
11ALIVE (2019), https://www.11alive.com/article/money/business/atlanta-is-nations-fourthfastest-gentrifying-city-study-says/85-36381375-80da-4b41-a83d439c9f99d40f?fbclid=IwAR3mqQn53_nRTO3sDUEIRD5uUGiVHL33z_T3xUmdBk4vvZfnt4-piSTY-MA.
49
Graham, supra note 6, at 1734.
50
Josh Green, ‘Urban Reclamation’ meets Atlanta’s Old Fourth Ward, CURBED ATLANTA
(Sept. 19, 2018, 10:17 AM), https://atlanta.curbed.com/atlanta-development/2018/9/19/
17861216/ponce-city-market-atlanta-old-fourth-ward.
51
Graham, supra note 6, at 1744–45; Lartey, supra note 41.
52
Mara Shalhoup, It’s the Best Time to be an Atlantan. It Might also be the Worst,
ATLANTA MAG. (2020), https://www.atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/its-the-best43
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projects attracted a wave of wealthy families to Atlanta, which in turn raised rents
and property taxes beyond what many low-income Atlantans could afford.53
To combat the negative externalities of gentrification, Atlanta implements a
variety of legal strategies. First, the city works with the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), to implement the Section 8 program.54
The Section 8 program was created by the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Act).55
This Act allows low-income families to use “vouchers” to pay for private housing;56 the government then “pays the landlord the difference between 30 percent
of the household’s adjusted income and the unit’s rent.”57 The Section 8 program
does not require landlords to accept vouchers, but does forbid landlords from
charging the government a price higher than the fair market rate for the unit.58
Section 8 programs can be administered in multiple ways,59 but Atlanta only
uses Section 8 funding for its Moderate Rehabilitation Program (Mod Rehab).60
Mod Rehab was created by amendment in 1978 and “expanded Section 8 rental
assistance to projects that were in need of repairs costing at least $1,000 per unit
to make the housing decent, safe, and sanitary.”61 HUD requires that Atlanta’s
Mod Rebab program provides rental subsidies for “low and moderately low-income individuals and families” who make below thirty percent of the Atlanta
Area Median Income.62 However, the program does not fully alleviate gentrification’s effect on affordable housing availability, as landlords in low-poverty
areas are more likely to reject Section 8 vouchers than landlords in high-poverty
time-to-be-an-atlantan-it-might-also-be-the-worst/ (arguing that the benefits of Atlanta revitalization projects are unequally distributed).
53
See Lartey, supra note 41 (discussing Cheryl Henderson’s story of rising rent costs in
Atlanta, especially near the Beltline); see also Ernie Suggs, Atlanta’s Gentrification Wave
Washes over Historic Old Fourth Ward, AJC (2019), https://www.ajc.com/business/economy/atlanta-gentrification-wave-washes-over-historic-old-fourthward/667fp9edFYZOpE89QOwrTP/ (discussing ways that Ponce City Market affects local
property taxes).
54
Section 8, CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-development/section-8 (last visited Sept.
2, 2020).
55
Section 8 Rental Certificate Program, HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/programd
escription/cert8 (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.; Glenn Thrush, With Market Hot, Landlords Slam the Door on Section 8 Tenants,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/us/politics/section-8-housing-vouchers-landlords.html.
59
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32284, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSING PROGRAMS:
HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 5 (2014).
60
Section 8, supra note 54.
61
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32284, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSING
PROGRAMS: HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 4–5
(2014).
62
Section 8, supra note 54.
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areas.63 If a family wants to secure affordable housing in a gentrifying neighborhood, it can thus be difficult to find landlords who will accept their vouchers.64
The program’s effectiveness is also limited because the federal government
stopped funding new projects in 1989.65
Atlanta also partners with HUD to “provide[] financing for low-income rental
housing within the Atlanta City limits.”66 The program utilizes funds made available through the federal Home Investment Partnership Program (HOME) by
providing low-interest loans to developers who build low-income rental housing.67 The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 authorized the HOME program.68 The Act ensured “that every American family [can]
afford a decent home in a suitable environment.”69 The Act requires HUD to
strengthen the federal government’s partnership with public and private institutions that can provide “housing affordable to low-income and moderate-income
families.”70 However, the program is subject to similar limitations as Atlanta’s
Section 8 program: Developers are unlikely to participate in the program if building luxury housing will be more profitable than accepting public funds.71
In addition to the Mod Rehab and HOME Program, Atlanta acted under the
federal Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) to create the
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP).72 HERA provides funds for local
63
See Sonam Vashi, Atlanta’s Section 8 Tenants Have Trouble Finding Good Housing,
SAPORTA REP. (Jan. 7, 2019, 6:10 PM), https://saportareport.com/atlantas-section-8-tenantshave-trouble-finding-good-housing/ (describing the challenges Atlanta residents face in finding landlords who will accept Section 8 vouchers).
64
See id.
65
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32284, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSING
PROGRAMS: HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 4–5
(2014).
66
Multifamily Housing Program, CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-development/multifamilyhousing-program (last visited Aug. 30, 2020).
67
Id.
68
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 40118, AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOME INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAM 1 (2014).
69
42 U.S.C.A. § 12701 (West 1990).
70
Id.
71
See Teresa Wiltz, Getting a Section 8 Voucher Is Hard. Finding a Landlord Willing to
Accept It Is Harder, PEW (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/08/31/getting-a-section-8-voucher-is-hard-finding-a-landlord-willing-to-accept-it-is-harder (“The goal of the Section 8 program is to give low-income families
the opportunity to escape high-poverty neighborhoods. Nevertheless, most voucher recipients
fail to do so, in large part because the HUD vouchers aren’t enough to cover the rents in higherincome neighborhoods.”); see also Vashi, supra note 63 (illustrating difficulties Section 8 tenants have in finding landlords to accept their vouchers).
72
Neighborhood Stabilization Program 1 (NSP1), CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-
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governments to “purchase and redevelop foreclosed properties” to create more
housing for low-income residents or fund other activities that benefit low- and
moderate-income residents.73 The Dodd-Frank Act requires cities to use their
funds to stabilize and develop housing in areas hit hardest by the 2008 recession.74 The Act also requires that at least twenty-five percent of the funds be
spent on stable housing for households below fifty percent of the Atlanta Area
Median Income.75 Atlanta’s NSP utilizes funds from HERA and the Dodd-Frank
Act “to acquire and redevelop abandoned or foreclosed properties that might otherwise become sources of . . . blight.”76
To supplement its federally funded programs, Atlanta enacted a variety of local laws to curb gentrification. In 2018, Atlanta adopted an Inclusionary Zoning
(IZ) ordinance;77 the IZ ordinance aims to “promote affordable housing for Atlantans who live and work in the City of Atlanta and is designed to keep Atlanta
rents relatively affordable for working individuals and households within the income range of police, firefighters, teachers, City and County employees, and
young professionals.”78 The IZ ordinance applies to “all new multifamily rental
developments, whether standalone or mixed-used multi-unit buildings, with at
least 10 units” located within a rapidly gentrifying Atlanta neighborhood.79 Each
developer in the area has the option to set aside ten to fifteen percent of their
units for moderate- to low-income renters or to pay a one-time “opt out” fee to
be “used for developing, rehabilitating, and/or reconstructing additional affordable housing units.”80 While some celebrate the IZ ordinance for making antigentrification efforts mandatory, others criticize the ordinance as chilling development in Atlanta.81 However, the City of Atlanta’s 2020 study found that the
ordinance did not cause a decline in requests for multi-family development
development/neighborhood-stabilization-program-nsp/neighborhood-stabilization-program
(last visited Sept. 4, 2020); Neighborhood Stabilization Program 3 (NSP3), CITY OF ATLANTA,
GA,
https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housingcommunity-development/neighborhood-stabilization-program-nsp/neighborhood-stabilization-program-825 (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
73
Neighborhood Stabilization Program 1 (NSP1), supra note 72.
74
Neighborhood Stabilization Program 3 (NSP3), supra note 72.
75
Id.
76
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-development/neighborhood-stabilization-program-nsp/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
77
Inclusionary Zoning Policy, CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-development/inclusionaryzoning-policy (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Stephannie Stokes, A Year In, Atlanta’s Inclusionary Zoning Does Little for Affordable
Housing, WABE (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.wabe.org/a-year-in-atlantas-inclusionary-zoning-does-little-for-affordable-housing/.
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permits in Atlanta.82 In fact, there was a 68% increase in multifamily building
permits issued after Atlanta adopted the ordinance.83 Most importantly, the ordinance led to the construction of 362 new affordable units for low-income families
between 2018–2020.84
Atlanta also utilizes land use laws to incentivize developers to provide affordable housing.85 To illustrate, the Georgia Legislature authorized Atlanta to pass
the Atlanta Urban Enterprise Zone Act (the UEZ Act) in 1983.86 The UEZ Act
empowers Atlanta to designate economically depressed areas that have high
speculative value as Urban Enterprise Zones (UEZ).87 Atlanta offers developers
of UEZ housing properties a ten-year tax abatement if they dedicate 20% of new
units for affordable housing and implement additional measures to prevent displacement of low-income residents.88 As of 2018, Atlanta’s fifteen UEZ properties had created 539 affordable units for residents who fall below 60% of the
Atlanta Median Income.89
Despite the UEZ program’s relative success, some advocates believe that Atlanta needs to expand the size of UEZ’s to effectively prevent displacement.90 A
study by the Housing Justice League and Research Action Cooperative concluded that Atlanta’s UEZ program is underused by developers and that the demand for affordable housing far exceeds what is available in UEZ developments.91 For example, a 2015 city planning document predicted that Atlanta
would gain 15,700 new housing units between 2015 and 2017, but only 2,800 of
those units would be affordable.92 As of 2017, Atlanta still had over 32,000 residents on the waiting list for public housing.93 In sum, although Atlanta

82

DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, INCLUSIONARY ZONING REPORT 1, 15 (2021), available at
https://www.atlantaga.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=49832.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 9.
85
Wendie N. Choudary, supra note 25.
86
Guide to the City of Atlanta’s Urban Enterprise Zone Program, CITY ATLANTA, GA,
https://www.atlantaga.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=9844 (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 2, 7.
89
Guide to the City of Atlanta’s Urban Enterprise Zone Program, supra note 86, at 5;
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implements promising tools to curb displacement, data suggests that the city
must expand current programs or adopt new tactics to make a sizable impact.94
B. Berlin
Gentrification in Berlin tells a different story. When the Berlin Wall fell in
1989, the German government began selling off property in East Berlin.95 The
government’s efforts successfully revitalized the economically depressed East,
as new owners converted derelict properties into clubs and art galleries.96 East
Berlin eventually “became the hip part of town with cultural capital that attracted
young professionals with financial capital, and its gentrification radiated . . .
slowly outward.”97 However, the sale of East Berlin real estate triggered more
economic development than Berliners could have imagined.98 With limited
housing supply and rapidly increasing demand, Berlin’s home purchase prices
increased by 70% between 2009 and 2014.99
Berlin’s housing policies also caused a steep increase in rent prices.100 Since
2000, the city cut all government-sponsored subsidies for building and property
renovations.101 Subsequently, Berlin’s building activities significantly decreased
while population and housing demand continued to grow.102 In addition to cutting subsidies, Berlin sold half of its public housing to alleviate pressure on the
city budget.103 Berlin’s gentrification thus quickly progressed from positive economic development to triggering a dramatic increase in housing costs.104
Since 2004, Berlin’s property prices more than doubled; between 2009 and
2014, property prices rose by 70%.105 In 2017 alone, property prices increased
by 20.5%.106 Over that span of five years, rents rose 56%.107 Berlin residents,
outraged that their government let gentrification spiral out of control, regularly
94
Id. at 20 (suggesting that expanded programs could include rent control while expanding programs like public housing).
95
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Id.
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Id.
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See id. (mentioning a local Berlin protest whose message was “[o]ur neighborhood, not
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99
Id.
100
Andrej Holm, Berlin’s Gentrification Mainstream, in THE BERLIN READER: A
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took to the streets in protest.108 Many residents joined grassroots movements,
arguing that affordable rent is a birthright.109
In response to citizens’ demands, the Berlin government adopted a number of
laws to curb gentrification. Berlin’s government is authorized to take positive
action against gentrification because the German Constitution (the Basic Law)
governs the country as a Sozialstaat (social welfare state).110 As a social welfare
state, “it is not enough to protect citizens from [harm] . . . the government must
also affirmatively promote the public good . . . [and] create legislation that actively promotes the public good.”111 In the context of displacement caused by
gentrification, the Basic Law places an affirmative duty on Berlin’s government
to provide “state aid in order to ensure a [basic] subsistence level. This is where
[Germany’s] social housing policy finds its origins and legitimization.”112
Article 14 and Article 20 of the Basic Law require the Berlin legislature to
balance the right to adequate housing113 against landowners’ right to control their
property.114 Article 14 mandates that the right to property is not absolute and
“[i]ts use shall also serve the public good.”115 In combination with Article 20’s
mandate that the State must “ensure the provision of adequate housing for the
population,” the Basic Law lays the legal foundation upon which the Berlin government can regulate property.116 The Basic Law also mandates that constitutional courts “review whether lawmakers have adequately considered and
weighed the right to property against the principles of human dignity, personality, and equality along with the principles of proportionality, rule of law, and the
108
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social welfare state.”117 Germany has thus created various legislative, judicial,
and administrative mechanisms to empower governments to balance the right to
own and profit off property against the right to adequate and affordable housing.
As authorized by Article 14 and Article 20,118 the Berlin government implemented a number of laws to combat gentrification.119 First, Berlin adopted a law
called the Mietpreisbremse;120 the law acts as “a rental brake that regulates how
steeply property owners can increase rents” and prevents residential landlords in
designated areas from increasing rent beyond 10% of the typical rental rate for
five years.121 Mietpreisbremse includes an escape hatch by exempting leases for
new housing which was completed after October 1, 2014 and for the first lease
term of homes having undergone substantial renovations.122
The Mietpreisbremse is subject to numerous criticisms.123 Some residents criticize the law for its loopholes, specifically that “the tenant is only eligible for a
refund on their overpaid rent from the date of their first complaint, not from the
date they first began paying an illegally high rent.”124 Because Berlin’s housing
supply is so limited, many tenants are not willing to incur the cost of suing their
landlord and others would rather pay a price premium than have to find alternative housing.125 Finally, despite the Basic Law’s mandate that German legislatures must balance the right to property against considerations of human rights
and equity, German courts have issued conflicting rulings on the constitutionality
of the Mietpreisbremse law.126
In addition to the Mietpreisbremse, Berlin passed the Milieuschutz laws; these
laws “require owners to obtain special permission before renovating rental properties or converting them into owner-occupied condominiums.”127 These laws
aim to prevent renter displacement by regulating the pace of development in up-
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and-coming neighborhoods.128 The Milieuschutz laws allow renters to financially
prepare for increased rents because prices will increase more predictably and at
a slower rate.129 However, the Milieuschutz laws are also subject to criticism,
primarily from tenants who claim that the “toothless” Milieuschutz laws lack effective enforcement mechanisms, allowing many landlords to escape liability.130
In October 2019, the Berlin government adopted a law freezing all rents at a
prescribed rate between June 2019 and June 2022 and imposed a cap on all rental
rates.131 The cap provides an absolute rent limit and a reference point for rent
reductions.132 Notably, the Senate of Berlin included exemptions for “newly constructed buildings that were ready for occupancy on or after 1 January 2014,
publicly subsidized apartments as well as dormitories and apartments operated
by recognised welfare organisations.”133 Due to accusations made by Mietendeckel’s opposers, implementation is currently stalled while the German federal government and courts determine the constitutionality of the Mietendeckel
laws.134 Thus, the Mietendeckel’s effectiveness has yet to be determined.135

III.

ATLANTA VERSUS BERLIN

Atlanta and Berlin utilize different legal mechanisms to fight displacement of
racially and socioeconomically marginalized populations.136 Berlin takes a more
punitive approach to limiting gentrification.137 Atlanta relies more so on developer and landlord tax incentives.138 However, each city has much to learn from
128
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one another. This Note proposes ways that Atlanta can adopt anti-gentrification
policies similar to Berlin’s, and vice-versa, to more effectively curb displacement
caused by gentrification.
The main difference between Atlanta and Berlin’s approach to displacement
lies in Berlin’s restrictive and punitive anti-gentrification laws.139 Berlin enforces
its laws by imposing heavy fines.140 Atlanta could benefit from adopting a more
punitive approach because developers are unlikely to opt into incentives programs when they could make more profits on the open housing market.141 Even
with Inclusionary Zoning, one of Atlanta’s mandatory programs, developers can
avoid liability by paying a one-time fee into an affordable housing trust fund.142
In reality, market forces and potential for profit risk outweighing incentives to
preserve affordable housing in Atlanta’s new developments.143 For these reasons,
Atlanta’s current policies have yet to slow gentrification’s momentum and prevent displacement of low-income Atlantans.144
However, one must consider barriers the City of Atlanta would face in implementing Berlin’s mandatory and punitive laws. To begin, the United States is not
a social welfare state.145 The German Constitution, on the other hand, recognizes
the individual as part of a larger community and requires the German government
“to look after its citizens and intervene in the market and social order if required
to maintain equality.”146 The German and United States governments approach
property regulation from fundamentally different legal frameworks, which affects the tools each can use to curb gentrification.147
Unlike Germany’s Basic Law, the U.S. Constitution does not require individuals to use their property for the public good;148 if anything, the Constitution
strictly protects the right to use, buy, or sell property to further the owner’s individual benefit.149 The Constitution only allows the government to regulate
aside 15 % of units for individuals who make 80 % of the area median income or 10 % of units
for lower-income residents”).
139
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140
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property without compensating the owner if necessary to protect public health,
welfare, safety, and morals and if it would not deprive the owner of all economically viable use of their property.150
The United States’ absolute commitment to negative rights limits local governments’ ability to regulate exploding real estate markets.151 To resolve this issue, United States courts could adjust their interpretation of negative rights in the
context of housing and property rights. Adjustments are necessary because the
difference between negative and positive government action becomes much
more ambiguous when applied to affordable housing policies.152 To illustrate, a
government’s refusal to adopt constitutional rent controls or other anti-gentrification laws may be a positive action within itself.153 Government inaction arguably protects the property rights of speculators and those who can pay inflated
property prices.154 Government inaction fails to protect—and may even violate—
the rights of those who are forced to give up their property because they can no
longer afford to live in gentrifying areas.155 In sum, gentrification complicates
the application of negative liberties and property rights in the United States. If
federal courts refuse to adjust traditional interpretations of negative property
rights, state and local governments will need to design anti-gentrification laws
that can withstand constitutional challenge.
Georgia state law also restrains Atlanta’s anti-gentrification efforts.156 Currently, Atlanta cannot implement Berlin’s laws or anything similar because rent
control laws are illegal in Georgia.157 Thus, Atlanta can only utilize incentivebased programs and weaker zoning laws to enact change. However, many of
these programs do not sufficiently appeal to developers’ self-interests.158
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Fortunately, Georgia’s rent control ban is not insurmountable. Some advocates
argue that the Atlanta government should request the law’s repeal or petition the
legislature to waive the law’s applicability to Atlanta.159 Even if the legislature
placed strict limitations on the degree to which Atlanta could restrict rents, rent
controls would still preserve stable housing for many low-income residents.160
Alternatively, Atlanta could control rents by passing a temporary rental rate
freeze. While this would still likely require permission of the legislature, the temporary freeze could slow gentrification long enough for the city to restructure its
anti-displacement programs.
Berlin, on the other hand, could also benefit from adopting parts of Atlanta’s
anti-gentrification mechanisms. The Berlin government fails to consistently enforce its rent control laws, which reduces incentives for compliance;161 if enforcement is unlikely, landlords may find it worth the risk to renovate housing
and raise rent prices. To combat gaps in enforcement, Berlin should take a page
from Atlanta’s book by offering incentives that capitalize on developer and landlords’ self-interest and that encourage compliance with the Mietpreisbremse and
Milieuschutz laws. The German Constitutional already authorizes the government to take positive action to ensure citizens have adequate housing.162 Under
this grant of authority, Berlin could guarantee significant tax breaks to developers who set aside a certain percentage of their units for affordable housing or
demonstrate long-term compliance with the Mietpreisbremse and Milieuschutz
laws.

IV.

CONCLUSION

While gentrification generates significant benefits for cities, its negative externalities cannot be justified. Displacement has unacceptable cultural, social,
and health effects:163 It prevents low-income families from accessing “educational and employment opportunities” and pushes affordable housing into areas
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with polluted environments and scarce healthcare resources.164 Thus, it is imperative that local, state, and federal governments collaborate to implement equitable and effective legal mechanisms to curb gentrification.
Gentrification cannot be solved by simply passing the right laws or adopting
the right incentives. Surrounding Atlanta and Berlin’s fight against gentrification
is the larger question of what role the government plays in regulating interactions
between the haves and have-nots, the rich and the poor, the marginalized and the
celebrated.165 How can and should governments, regardless of social-welfare or
capitalistic orientations, actively protect property rights of low-income citizens?
Should this power instead be entrusted to non-governmental groups? Should
low-income Americans be empowered to demand economic justice, and not just
bureaucratic mercy?166 Regardless of who leads the battle against gentrification,
government support is essential.167 Thus, Atlanta and Berlin must rise to the challenge and fight for their residents’ ability to choose their neighborhood and
home.

164

See Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3 (“Today, some public health researchers
conclude that ‘racial residential segregation is the cornerstone on which Black-white disparities in health have been built in the U.S.’ Despite the end of de jure segregation, public and
private land use decisions have ensured that place-based factors, from access to educational
and employment opportunities, to exposures to pollution and toxic substances like lead paint,
continue to geographically distribute health outcomes.”).
165
See generally Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 152 (noting that legal perspectives on positive and negative rights impact government’s role in society).
166
Barbara Stark, ARTICLE: Urban Despair and Nietzsche’s “Eternal Return:” From the
Municipal Rhetoric of Economic Justice to the International Law of Economic Rights, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 185, 237 (“My clients were glad to have someone in a suit on their
side, but to our shared dismay, they rarely had any rights—cognizable claims to justice rather
than to mercy. Indeed, the only ‘category of rights . . . relevant . . . was the somewhat dubious
one . . . of formal bureaucratic procedural rationality.’”).
167
See, e.g., Crispell, supra note 24 (citing government policies as helping gentrification
in the Bay Area’s Chinatown and East Palo Alto).

